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THE ROAD TO PEACE STARTS IN JERUSALEM:
THE "CONDOMINIUM" SOLUTION
John V. Whitbeck*
There will never be a durable peace in the Middle East without a settle-
ment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict acceptable both to most Israelis
and to most Palestinians. That is a fact. There also will never be a lasting
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without a solution to the sta-
tus of Jerusalem acceptable both to most Israelis and to most Palestini-
ans. That also is a fact, one which is increasingly difficult (and dangerous)
for anyone to ignore.
It is still widely assumed that no such solution exists. This has led Israel
to insist that the status of Jerusalem should not even be discussed until all
the lesser problems of Israeli-Palestinian relations have been resolved, at
which point, perhaps, some previously unimaginable solution may mirac-
ulously appear. While, according to the Declaration of Principles,1 per-
manent status negotiations are to commence not later than May 4, 1996,2
and Jerusalem is explicitly one of the "remaining issues" to be covered
during those negotiations, the Declaration of Principles is ambiguous as
to whether "all" of the "remaining issues" are to be discussed at once.3
* John V. Whitbeck is an international lawyer based in Paris, and a graduate of
Harvard Law School. His "Two States, One Holy Land" framework for peace was the
subject of a three-day conference of 24 Israelis and Palestinians held in Cairo in November
1993. His solution for Jerusalem was one of the plans presented at a two-day conference
on the Theme, "Jerusalem - Best Second Choices" held in Jerusalem in June 1994. Ear-
lier versions of this paper were published in 1994 by AI-Quds (Jerusalem), Middle East
International (London), The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Middle East In-
sight (Washington), Middle East Policy (Washington), and in 1995 by Palestine-Israel Jour-
nal (Jerusalem).
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1525 (entered into force Oct. 13, 1993) [hereinafter
Declaration of Principles]. The Declaration of Principles was signed by "[tihe Government
of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the
Middle East Peace Conference)" on September 13, 1993 in Washington, D.C. Id. at 1527.
2. See id. at 1529, art. V, § 2. The Interim Agreement stipulates that "negotiations on
the permanent status ... will start ... not later than May 4, 1996." Preamble, Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (signed by the Gov-
ernment of the State of Israel and the PLO on Sept. 28, 1995 in Washington, D.C.).
3. Declaration of Principles, supra note 1, at 1529, art. V, § 3. Section 3 states that
"these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settle-
Catholic University Law Review
Absent a major change of heart, Israel is likely to refuse to discuss Jerusa-
lem (at least in any serious way) until the very end of the projected five-
year "interim period" in 1999.
The signing of the Declaration of Principles has not slowed Israel's ef-
forts to change the "facts on the ground" in and around Jerusalem in its
favor. Particularly in light of the Israeli government's efforts to hobble
existing Palestinian institutions in the city, its declared intention to build
new housing units for some 32,500 Israelis at Har Homa, between the
Jerusalem Arab neighborhood of Umm-Taba and the neighboring West
Bank Arab city of Beit Sahour, and the constant talk of expanding the
municipal boundaries to incorporate Ma'aleh Adumim, a huge West
Bank settlement several kilometers east of Jerusalem, and other nearby
settlements, Palestinians understandably fear that Israel's true intention
is to create a fait accompli by 1999, permitting Israel to stonewall on Jeru-
salem in the expectation (or hope) that the Palestinians would by then
have no choice but to bear the unbearable.
In these circumstances, doubts, distrust, and even despair remain wide-
spread. Many people on both sides have no faith in the current "peace
process" and no desire to become involved in it and to help it to succeed
because they perceive at the end of the road a great immovable boulder
named Jerusalem which they believe condemns any "peace process" to
ultimate and inevitable failure. Nothing is more likely to instill construc-_
tive confidence in the eventual success of the "peace process" and to ac-
celerate the essential moral, spiritual and psychological transformation
toward a cooperative, rather than a confrontational, view of the future of
the Middle East than a prompt recognition that a solution to the status of
Jerusalem does exist. Fortunately, there is one solution which has a real
chance of being acceptable both to most Israelis and to most Palestinians.
THE JOINT SOVEREIGNTY SOLUTION
When Israelis and Palestinians speak about Jerusalem, they are not
simply establishing negotiating positions. Jerusalem commands too tight
a grip on hearts and minds. Their repeated and virtually unanimous posi-
tions must be taken seriously. If one accepts, as one must, that no Israeli
government could ever accept a redivision of Jerusalem, and if one ac-
cepts, as one must, that no Palestinian leadership could ever accept a per-
manent status solution which gave the Palestinian State (and, through it,
the Arab and Islamic worlds) no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then
only one solution is conceivable - joint sovereignty over an undivided
ments, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and
other issues of common interest." Id.
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city. In the context of a two-state solution, Jerusalem could form an undi-
vided part of both states, constitute the capital of both states and be ad-
ministered by an umbrella municipal council and local district councils.
In the proper terminology of international law, the city would be a "con-
dominium" of Israel and Palestine.
Joint undivided sovereignty, while rare, is not without precedent.
Chandigarh is the joint undivided capital of two Indian states. For more
than seventy years, the entire Pacific nation of Vanuatu (formerly the
New Hebrides Condominium) was under the joint undivided sovereignty
of Britain and France. For more than 700 years, the Principality of An-
dorra has been under the joint undivided sovereignty of French and Span-
ish individuals (currently the President of France and the Bishop of Seo
de Urgel) while its administration is entrusted to an elected General
Council.
As a joint capital, Jerusalem could have Israeli government offices
principally in its western sector, Palestinian government offices princi-
pally in its eastern sector and municipal offices in both. A system of dis-
tricts or French-style arrondissements could bring municipal
administration closer to the different communities in the City (including
the ultra-orthodox Jewish community). To the extent that either state
might wish to control persons or goods entering it from the other state,
this regulation could occur at the points of exit from, rather than entry to,
Jerusalem. In a context of peace, particularly one coupled with economic
union, the need for such controls would be minimal.
In a sense, Jerusalem can be viewed as a cake that could be sliced
either vertically or horizontally. Either way, the Palestinians would get
their share of the cake, but, while most Israelis could never voluntarily
swallow a vertical slice, they might just be able to swallow a horizontal
slice. Indeed, by doing so, Israel would finally achieve international rec-
ognition of Jerusalem as its capital.
Jerusalem is both a municipality on the ground and a symbol in hearts
and minds. Undivided but shared in this way, Jerusalem could be a sym-
bol of reconciliation and hope for Jews, Muslims, Christians, and the
world as a whole. Furthermore, since a city needs no army but only po-
lice, Jerusalem could also be fully demilitarized, finally becoming the
"City of Peace" which all three religions have long proclaimed it to be.
Among peace-oriented Israelis and Palestinians, there is a broad con-
sensus that, in any permanent status solution, Jerusalem should remain
physically undivided. However, there is no consensus on how to solve the
problem of sovereignty. That issue remains almost too hot to handle. In-
deed, it is a bit like death: Everyone knows that it is at the end of the
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road, but virtually no one wants to talk about it because virtually no one
can see any solution or happy ending.
The issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem is so emotional, and the con-
sensus within each community behind its own uncompromising position is
(or is at least proclaimed and perceived to be) so nearly universal, that
there is no incentive for those within the communities directly engaged to
propose original or unorthodox ideas on the subject. Even today, any
Israeli or Palestinian who publicly sought to promote a compromise solu-
tion to the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem which he honestly believed
could be acceptable to the other side would risk being castigated as a
traitor or a heretic by the vocal majority of his compatriots or
coreligionists.
When the Israeli Moshe Amirav and the Palestinian Hanna Siniora
published their courageous and thoughtful joint article entitled, "Jerusa-
lem: Resolving the Unresolvable,"4 during the winter of 1991/92, they did
not shy away from making controversial proposals. These included their
calls for parity between Israelis and Palestinians in all aspects of civil,
political and religious life in the City, for a four-fold expansion of the
area within the municipal boundaries, so as to equalize the size of the two
communities, and for strict "immigration" controls to maintain this dem-
ographic balance. However, even they did not dare to address directly
the question of sovereignty, "so as to appear non-threatening to Israelis,"
but sought instead to make it "manageable by breaking it down into its
various components" and tackling each one separately.
"Joint undivided sovereignty" is a concept which even highly intelligent
people are often unable to comprehend. Perhaps, paradoxically, it is too
simple to be easily understood. While sovereignty is commonly viewed as
the state-level equivalent of ownership, joint undivided ownership of land
or a house (between husband and wife or, through inheritance, among
distant cousins) is scarcely uncommon. Such joint undivided ownership is
clear as a matter of law and comprehensible as a matter of practice. Joint
owners must determine how their common property is to be
administered.
4. Moshe Amirav & Hanna Siniora, Jerusalem: Resolving the Unresolvable, in Is-
RAELI PALESTINIAN ROUNDTABLE FORUM ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM (Winter 1991/
92), published by Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information. Moshe Amirav
was at the time a member of the Jerusalem City Council and head of the committee for
equalizing services to East Jerusalem. He is currently a businessman in Jerusalem. Hanna
Siniora was at the time Editor-in-Chief of the daily newspaper, AI-Fajr. He is currently
publisher of the weekly newspaper, The Jerusalem Times and Chairman of the European




In seeking a solution to the status of Jerusalem, it is essential to distin-
guish between sovereignty and municipal administration. Questions of
municipal administration, including the division of authorities between an
umbrella municipal council and local district councils, exist for any sizable
city, irrespective of any questions of sovereignty. In Jerusalem's case, it
clearly would be desirable, employing the European Union's principle of
"subsidiarity," to devolve as many aspects of municipal governance as
possible to the district council level, reserving to the umbrella municipal
council only those major matters which can only be administered effi-
ciently at a city-wide level (potentially very few matters, since London
has continued to function with only local district councils and no umbrella
municipal council since the Greater London Council was abolished in
1982). Since there are currently no integrated neighborhoods in Jerusa-
lem, assuring that Israelis are subject to Israeli administration, and Pales-
tinians to Palestinian administration, at the district council level would
present no practical problems.
If the devolution of authority to the district council level was broad and
deep, the potentially inflammatory issue of the percentage representa-
tions of the two communities on the umbrella municipal council would be
much less problematic. If elected district councils named their own rep-
resentatives to the umbrella municipal council, a more technocratic and
less demagogic style of municipal government might be possible. If the
percentage representations of the two communities, through their respec-
tive municipal districts, on the umbrella municipal council were fixed at
an agreed level (whatever that level might be) and made impervious to
subsequent demographic changes within the municipal boundaries, the
issue of post-peace "immigration" of Israelis and Palestinians into Jerusa-
lem would become a non-issue and the purely political motivation for
building more Jewish residential districts in expanded East Jerusalem or
expanding the current municipal boundaries even further to incorporate
additional Jewish population centers would evaporate.
While municipal administration involves numerous practical questions,
sovereignty over Jerusalem is fundamentally a symbolic, psychological,
and virtually theological question. Symbolism, psychology, and theology
are extraordinarily important in connection with Jerusalem (more so than
with any other city on earth), but it is important to recognize that this is
the nature of the question. An "internationalization" of the City, with
neither Israel nor Palestine possessing sovereignty, was recommended in
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1947 by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (11).5 This
recommendation has never been revoked and continues to enjoy signifi-
cant international support and moral authority. However, "international-
ization" would serve no useful symbolic or psychological purpose for
those most directly involved and thus cannot be a realistic option today.
Assigning sovereignty over an undivided City both to Israel and to Pal-
estine should satisfy to the maximum degree possible the symbolic and
psychological needs of both Israelis and Palestinians. It could also gener-
ate profound positive psychological benefits for the quality of "life after
peace" by requiring in spirit and in practice a sharing of the City and
cooperation with "the other" rather than a new partitioning of the City
and mere toleration of "the other" or the continuing domination of one
people over another, with all the poisonous frictions that such domination
inevitably provokes.
One of the strengths and beauties of joint undivided sovereignty, and a
potential advantage in making it acceptable to both peoples and to their
leaderships, is that it would not require either Israel or Palestine to re-
nounce sovereignty over any territory over which it has asserted sover-
eignty. The State of Palestine asserts sovereignty only over those
Palestinian lands conquered and occupied in 1967. Of those lands, the
State of Israel asserts sovereignty only over expanded East Jerusalem.
Under a "condominium" solution, in the only place where current sover-
eignty claims overlap, sovereignty would overlap and be shared. To re-
peat, neither Israel nor Palestine would have to renounce sovereignty over
any territory over which it has asserted sovereignty. Potentially intractable
negotiations over where to draw international borders through and even
within Jerusalem would be completely avoided, because the City would
not be divided but shared.
Israelis should ask themselves what (if anything) they would actually
be giving up in accepting joint undivided sovereignty over Jerusalem.
Roughly seventy percent of the City's residents are now Israelis, and Pal-
estinian residents already have the right to vote in municipal elections.
That would not change. Put most simply, all Israel would have to do is
say, "United Jerusalem, within the expanded boundaries which we have
unilaterally established, is the eternal capital of Israel ... but, in order to
make peace possible, we accept that it is also the capital of Palestine."
That is all. While, today, only Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Zaire even
5. G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 131 (1947). Resolution 181, in pertinent
part, states that "[t]he City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a
special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trustee-
ship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Au-
thority on behalf of the United Nations." Id. at 146.
[Vol. 45:781
"Condominium" Solution
recognize West Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and no country recognizes
Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, if Israel adopted such a position
and implemented it with Palestinian consent, virtually all countries would
promptly recognize united Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Embassies would
move there. Is this really so unthinkable for Israelis? Is this really
impossible?
ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY MYTH
There is a widespread misconception among Israelis that, under the sta-
tus quo, Israel possesses sovereignty over expanded East Jerusalem. It
does not. It possesses administrative control. A country can acquire ad-
ministrative control by force of arms. It can acquire sovereignty only
with the consent of the international community.
When Iraq conquered Kuwait, it asserted sovereignty over it. No other
country recognized that claim. For the next seven months, Iraq's position
in Kuwait - effective administrative control coupled with an unrecog-
nized claim to sovereignty - was, as a matter of international law, effec-
tively indistinguishable from Israel's position in expanded East Jerusalem
today. (Indonesia's position in East Timor and Morocco's position in
Western Sahara are similar.) Israel has possessed and exercised adminis-
trative control over expanded East Jerusalem for almost twenty-nine
years. To this day, not one of the world's other 192 sovereign states has
recognized its claim to sovereignty. Furthermore, Israel's purported an-
nexation of expanded East Jerusalem has been declared null and void and
"Jerusalem" has been explicitly included among the occupied territories
in a long series of unanimous or near-unanimous United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly Resolutions.
Israel could retain administrative control over expanded East Jerusa-
lem indefinitely. That is a question of military strength and political will.
However, it is most unlikely that it will ever acquire sovereignty over
expanded East Jerusalem unless it agrees to a permanent solution to the
status of Jerusalem along the lines set forth above. That is a question of
law. Indeed, because the right of a country to declare any part of its
sovereign territory to be its capital is not contested, the refusal of virtu-
ally all countries to recognize West Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the
maintenance of virtually all embassies in Tel Aviv constitutes striking evi-
dence of the refusal of the international community, pending an agreed
permanent solution to the status of Jerusalem, to concede that any part of
the City is Israel's sovereign territory. A clearer understanding of the
legal status quo regarding Jerusalem could make Israeli public opinion
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less reflexively resistant to any modification of that status quo, even in
exchange for peace.
JOINT SOVEREIGNTY: THE ONLY OPTION FOR BOTH SIDES
Joint undivided sovereignty is not the first choice of either Israelis or
Palestinians. Exclusive Israeli sovereignty over the whole City would
clearly be the first choice of most Israelis, but this is equally clearly unac-
ceptable not only to Palestinians but also to the Arab and Islamic coun-
tries with which Israel wishes to have normal diplomatic and economic
relations and which would accept any permanent status terms which the
Palestinians might accept, except that one, as well as to significant seg-
ments of the international community beyond the Arab and Islamic
worlds. A division of sovereignty and an allocation of administrative con-
trol strictly in accordance with the pre-1967 border (and hence with inter-
national law and United Nations Security Council Resolution 242)6
would clearly be the first choice of most Palestinians. However, particu-
larly in light of the presence of the Western Wall, enormous new Jewish
residential districts and even a slight Israeli population majority in ex-
panded East Jerusalem, this is equally clearly inconceivable from the Is-
raeli standpoint. (While expanded East Jerusalem is effectively
indistinguishable from the other occupied territories as a matter of inter-
national law, it most certainly is distinguishable and distinguished as a
matter of Israeli domestic law and, most importantly, in Israeli public
perception.)
All who truly wish to achieve peace must, logically, discard these irrec-
oncilable "first choice options." Such people should search now for a
mutually acceptable "best second choice." If one accepts the two prem-
ises that no Israeli government could ever accept a redivision of Jerusa-
lem and that no Palestinian leadership (and certainly not the Arab and
Islamic worlds) could ever accept a permanent status solution that gave
the Palestinian State no share of sovereignty in Jerusalem, then, as a mat-
ter of pure logic, joint undivided sovereignty is the only possible second
choice if peace is ever to be achieved. However, even if the first premise
were untrue (there being no reason to believe that the second premise
might be untrue) and a division of sovereignty in Jerusalem could be
agreed upon, joint undivided sovereignty still might be the best possible
second choice for both Israelis and Palestinians.
Any solution to the status of Jerusalem, like any solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict as a whole, must have two characteristics if it is to
6. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF.22/Rev.2 (1967).
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produce a durable peace: It must be workable, and, at least in some mea-
sure, it must be inspirational. If a potential solution is technically worka-
ble but fails to inspire hearts and minds, it is unlikely to succeed. If a
potential solution inspires hearts and minds but is unworkable on the
ground, it too is unlikely to succeed. In thinking both about Jerusalem
and about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole, all who truly wish to
achieve peace should search for solutions that are both workable and
inspirational.
APPLYING THE LAW UNDER JOINT SOVEREIGNTY
The most obvious question regarding joint undivided sovereignty is
"What law would apply?" Many assume that this question is unanswer-
able and that the "condominium" solution for Jerusalem, notwithstanding
its inspirational aspects, would be unworkable in practice. In fact, there is
not merely one potentially workable answer to this question but several.
One approach would be for Jerusalem to have its own distinct body of
laws, neither wholly Israeli nor wholly Palestinian and applicable within
its boundaries to all who are present there. Superficially, there is an ap-
pealing simplicity to this approach, which would have been virtually una-
voidable had the City been "internationalized" pursuant to the United
Nations' 1947 partition formula. However, as a practical matter, such a
body of laws could only be based on those currently in force in the City as
subsequently modified by the umbrella municipal council or, perhaps, by
agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian states. Consequently, Je-
rusalem's laws would, for the foreseeable future, be virtually indistin-
guishable from Israel's laws (draining joint undivided sovereignty of most
of its content in Palestinian eyes), while the umbrella municipal council,
best kept technocratic, could become highly politicized. While the "Jeru-
salem law" approach could be workable, there are better approaches.
A second approach would be to apply Israeli law in every Israeli-ma-
jority district as fully as though that district were an integral part of Israel
alone and to apply Palestinian law in every Palestinian-majority district as
fully as though that district were an integral part of Palestine alone. This
is the approach called for in the "scattered sovereignty" model7 devel-
oped in recent years by the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and In-
formation (IPCRI) in Jerusalem, which would draw international borders
around every currently existing village, neighborhood, or settlement in
expanded East Jerusalem and put each of them under the exclusive sover-
7. ISRAELJPALESTINE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION, NEW THINKING
ON THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM, A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM: SCATTERED
SOVEREIGNTY (Gershon Baskin ed., 1994).
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eignty of one of the two states (thereby requiring both Israel and Pales-
tine to renounce sovereignty over territory over which they have asserted
sovereignty). This approach would be entirely appropriate if a "scattered
sovereignty" model were implemented and would even be potentially
workable if a "condominium" solution were implemented. However, it is
conceptually inconsistent with the uplifting vision of a single, undivided
City serving as the capital of both states, would produce practical results
which both peoples would consider undesirable and would tend to lock in
indefinitely the pervasive segregation of the City's existing
neighborhoods.
A third approach, more supple and subtle, is the most promising one.
Rather than seeking to establish a distinct body of laws for Jerusalem or
providing a purely territorial basis for determining whether Israeli or Pal-
estinian law applies, one can envision a more flexible system whereby the
law applicable in any specific instance would depend on the subject mat-
ter, the parties involved, and the municipal district in which the issue or
dispute arises.
Legal experts negotiating in good faith while remaining mindful of
three broad areas of law (civil, criminal, and personal) and two potential
bases for jurisdiction (personal and territorial) should be fully capable of
agreeing upon appropriate choices of applicable law and jurisdiction
based on objective, results-oriented criteria. Their task would be to agree
upon those situations in which the personal/national element would con-
trol, those in which the territorial element would control, those in which
an agreed "tiebreaker" would decide and those (if any) in which resort to
a "mixed court" would be necessary.
A few examples should help to clarify how such a flexible legal system
would work. Both sides might well agree that the personal/national ele-
ment should control in all personal law matters (most notably marriage,
divorce, and inheritance), with Israeli law applicable to Israelis and Pales-'
tinian law applicable to Palestinians regardless of the municipal district in
which they live. They might also agree that the territorial element should
control in matters relating to property, with the prevailing law of the mu-
nicipal district where the property is located being applicable regardless
of the citizenships of the parties involved.
In the area of contractual disputes, it might be agreed that Israeli law
should apply to disputes between Israelis and Palestinian law to disputes
between Palestinians, with the territorial element serving as a
"tiebreaker" in any contractual dispute between an Israeli Jerusalemite
and a Palestinian Jerusalemite where there is no explicit "choice of law"
clause in a written contract. It also might be agreed that the territorial
[Vol. 45:781
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element should control in cases of theft, with the accused thief being
deemed to have made his own effective "choice of law."
The most difficult and highly charged situation probably would involve
a murder within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. There almost
certainly would be agreement that, if both victim and suspect were Israeli,
Israeli law should apply even if the crime occurred in a Palestinian-major-
ity district and that if both victim and suspect were Palestinian, Palestin-
ian law should apply even if the crime occurred in an Israeli-majority
district. If victim and suspect were of different citizenships, a
"tiebreaker" would be required. It is not certain that a territorial
"tiebreaker" would be acceptable to both sides or, indeed, to either side.
It is possible that it could be agreed that the law of the suspect's citizen-
ship or the law of the victim's citizenship should apply. It also is possible
that no "tiebreaker" could be agreed upon for cases of murder and per-
haps for some other difficult and highly charged situations as well.
The last resort would be a "mixed court," composed of one Israeli
judge, one Palestinian judge, and one international judge accepted in ad-
vance by both governments. There is a history of "mixed courts" operat-
ing and dispensing a reasonable degree of justice in diverse places
(including the New Hebrides Condominium) and in difficult circum-
stances during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ideally, such
courts would not be needed in Jerusalem. However, if, in one or more
instances, no objective criteria could be agreed upon for determining
whose law and jurisdiction would apply, then "mixed courts" would be
preferable to no solution at all.
At first glance, the results-oriented balancing process necessary to
agree upon such a legal structure for a Jerusalem equitably shared by
both peoples and their states may seem complicated. However, the prac-
tical impact on the lives of Jerusalem's citizens would almost certainly be
more beneficial than under a more rigid system. Furthermore, the fluid-
ity of such a legal system itself would emphasize the unique nature of
Jerusalem as the undivided capital of two sovereign states. Agreeing
upon the relevant practical criteria would be infinitely easier than rolling
aside the symbolic and psychological boulder of the issue of sovereignty.
The "condominium" solution is a workable solution.
CONCLUSION
The "condominium" solution has the advantage of being consistent
with both the letter and the spirit of the formal American position on
Jerusalem, which urges that the City should remain undivided and that its
permanent status should be determined through negotiations between Is-
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raelis and Palestinians. It is even consistent (at least up to a point) with
the letter (if not the spirit) of the formal Israeli position, as restated by
the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during his joint press conference
with President Bill Clinton in Jerusalem on October 27, 1994; "Jerusalem
must remain united under Israel[i] sovereignty."8 Whether a united Jeru-
salem could be shared under the sovereignty of Israel and Palestine has
not yet been formally addressed. However, the absence of the word "ex-
clusive" from the official Israeli formulation is an encouraging sign. By
leaving this word unstated, the current Israeli government has avoided
tying itself up in a rhetorical straitjacket and has left open the door to
adopting the "condominium" solution without excessive political
embarrassment.
The "condominium" solution is further from the traditional Palestinian
position with its steadfast reliance on "international legitimacy." With an
exceptionally weak hand to play in terms of military strength and power
politics, Palestinians have long drawn comfort from their certainty that
international law is on their side. However, the decisions to sign the Dec-
laration of Principles and its follow-up agreements reflect a mature ac-
ceptance of the brutal truth that a strong position under international law
does not alone ensure even the slightest measure of justice. Agreeing not
to insist on their strong position under international law with respect to
expanded East Jerusalem and to share sovereignty in the only part of the
former Palestine Mandate where current sovereignty claims overlap (as
well as in West Jerusalem) may be the practical price which Palestinians
must pay for successfully asserting Palestine's strong position under inter-
national law and Palestinian sovereignty with respect to all other Pales-
tinian lands conquered and occupied in 1967.
Indeed, since mid-1995, President Yasser Arafat and other members of
the Palestinian leadership have given increasingly clear indications that
they are susceptible to the charms and practical merits of the "condomin-
ium" solution and favorably disposed toward it. Faisal Husseini, in
charge of the "Jerusalem file" for the Palestinian leadership, has stated
that, when permanent status negotiations begin, "we will insist that the
negotiations cover all of Jerusalem (including West Jerusalem occupied
8. Rabin and Clinton News Conference in Jerusalem, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Oct. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (reporting
news conference of U.S. President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at
the Jerusalem International Convention Center in Jerusalem); see also Ethan Bronner,
Israel Suspends Land Takeovers: Action Defuses Government Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, May




by Israel in 1948) and not only East Jerusalem." 9 In a speech at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government in October 1995, President
Arafat asked, "Why not Jerusalem as the capital of two states, with no
Berlin wall? United, open, coexistence, living together."'" The audience
rose for a standing ovation.
If Israelis and Palestinians can agree (even if only silently for the mo-
ment) that a mutually acceptable solution for the status of Jerusalem does
exist, all the other pieces of the delicate peace puzzle should fall into
place, and the actual achievement of a durable Middle East peace would
become attainable well before 1999. Without a mutually acceptable solu-
tion for the status of Jerusalem, everything will fall apart. That cannot be
permitted to happen.
The road to "interim self-rule" may start in Gaza and Jericho and ex-
tend to other West Bank cities, but the road to peace starts in Jerusalem.
The time to think and talk about Jerusalem is now.
9. Michael Jansen, East Jerusalem's Rising Confidence, MIDDLE E. INT'L, Feb. 2,
1996, at 5.
10. Paul Findley, "Mr. President, Mr. Palestine", WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFFs.,
Dec. 1995, at 8, 87; see Christopher B. Daly, Hundreds at Harvard Cheer Arafat's Talk,
WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1995, at A23; see also Joseph Mallia, Arafat Woos Harvard With His
Vision of Peace, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 25, 1995, at 1; George Moffett, Arafat Woos Ameri-
cans as Congress Stays Cool, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 26, 1995, at 1 (noting that
Arafat's audience gave him a standing ovation).
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